## BU CS591 S1

Foundations of Private Data Analysis

$$
\text { Spring } 2023
$$

## Lecture 01: Introduction

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## Today

- Course Intro
- A taste of the syllabus
$>$ Attacks on information computed from private data
- A first private algorithm: randomized response


## This Course

- Intro to research on privacy in ML and statistics
$>$ Mathematical models
- How do we formulate nebulous concepts?
- How do we assess and critique these formulations?
$>$ Algorithmic techniques
- Skill sets you will work on
$>$ Theoretical analysis
$>$ Critical reading of research literature in CS and beyond
$>$ Programming
- Prerequisites
$>$ Comfort writing proofs about probability, linear algebra, algorithms
$>$ MS/undergrads: discuss your background with instructor.


## Administrivia

- Web page: https://dpcourse.github.io/2023-spring/
$>$ Communication via Piazza
$>$ Lectures on Gather
> Course work on Gradescope
- Your jobs
$>$ Lecture preparation, attendance, participation
$>$ Homework
$>$ Project


## Coursework

- Lecture prep and in-class work
- Homework
$>$ Due Fridays every 2 weeks
$>$ Limited collaboration is permitted
- Groups of size $\leq 4$
$>$ Academic honesty: You must
- Acknowledge collaborators (or write "collaborators: none")
- Write your solutions yourself, and be ready to explain them orally
- Rule of thumb: walk away from collaboration meetings with no notes.
- Use only course materials (except for reading general background, e.g., on probability, calculus, etc)
- Project (details TBA)
- Read and summarize a set of 2-3 related papers
- Identify open questions
- Develop new material (application of a technique to a new data set, work on open question, show some assumption is necessary, ...)
- Presentation in last week of class


## For flipped classroom lectures

- Ahead of time
$>$ Watch video
- Engage actively and take notes by hand as you watch
$>$ Read lecture notes
$>$ Answer Gradescope pre-class questions
- In class
$>$ Be present
- Let us know on Piazza if that is an issue in general or for specific lectures. Default is attendance at every class
$>$ Actively participate in problem-solving
- Problems will be posted ahead of time
$>$ Take notes on your work
- After class
$>$ Submit your notes (photo or electronic) on Gradescope


## For traditional lectures

- In class
$>$ Be present
- Let us know on Piazza if that is an issue in general or for specific lectures. Default is attendance at every class
$>$ Bring questions
$>$ Actively participate in problem-solving and feedback questions
- After class
$>$ Work on the homework!


## To do list for this week

- Make sure you have access to Piazza, Gradescope
- Read the syllabus
- By Tuesday:
$>$ Fill background survey (to be posted; see Piazza)
$>$ Watch videos, read notes, answer questions for Lecture 2


## Today

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## Data are everywhere

- Decisions increasingly automated using rules based on personal data

- Census data used to apportion congressional seats
$>$ Think about citizenship question
- Also enforce Voting Rights Act, allocate Title I funds, design state districts, ...


## Machine learning on your devices

- Statistical models trained using data from your phones
- Statistical models trained from other personal data


## Machine learning on your devices

- Statistical models trained using data from your phones
> Offer sentence completion
> Convert voice to speech
> Select, for you and others to see,
- Content (e.g. FB newsfeed)
- Ads
- Recommendations for products ("You might also like...")
- Statistical models trained from other personal data
> Advise judges' bail decisions
> Allocate police resources
> Advise doctors on diagnosis/treatment


## Privacy in Statistical Databases

## Individuals <br> Researchers



Large collections of personal information

- census data
- medical/public health
- social networks
- education

Statistical analysis benefits society

Valuable because they reveal so much about our lives

## Two conflicting goals

- Utility: release aggregate statistics
- Privacy: individual information stays hidden


## Utility

## Privacy

## How do we define "privacy"?

- Studied since I960's in
$>$ Statistics
$>$ Databases \& data mining
$>$ Cryptography
- This course section: Rigorous foundations and analysis


## First attempt: Remove obvious identifiers


"Al recognizes blurred faces" [McPherson Shokri Shmatikov 'I6]


- Everything is an identifier
- Attacker has external information
- "Anonymization" schemes are regularly broken

[Ganta Kasiviswanathan S '08]


## Reidentification attack example

[Narayanan, Shmatikov 2008]


Anonymized NetFlix data


Public, incomplete IMDB data

Alice
Bob
Charlie
Danielle Erica
Frank

On average, four movies uniquely identify user

Identified NetFlix Data

## Is the problem granularity?

What if we only release aggregate information?

Problem I: Models leak information

- Support vector machine output reveals individual data points

- Deep learning models reveal even more


## Models Leak Information

| Somali • | $\stackrel{\text { English }}{ }$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| ag ag ag ag ag ag ag |  |
| ag ag ag | And its length was <br> one hundred cubits <br> at one end |


| Somali | $\leftarrow$ | English |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| ag ag ag ag ag ag ag ag ag ag ag ag | And they came to be at the gates of <br> the valley by the valley by the valley |  |

Models can leak information about training data in unexpected ways

- Example: Smart Compose in Gmail
> Haven't seen you in a while.
Hope you are doing well
$>$ John Doe's SSN is 920-24-1930
[Carlini et al. 2018]
- Modern deep learning algorithms often "memorize" inputs
$\qquad$

[Carlini et al. 20]
Current language models memorize irrelevant information.


## Is the problem granularity?

What if we only release aggregate information?
Problem I: Models leak information

Problem 2: Statistics together may encode data

- Example: Average salary before/after resignation
- More generally:

Too many, "too accurate" statistics reveal individual information
> Reconstruction attacks

- Reconstruct all or part of data
$>$ Membership attacks
- Determine if a target individual is in (part of) the data set

> Cannot release everything everyone would want to know

Differential privacy

## Differential Privacy

- Robust notion of "privacy" for algorithmic outputs
$>$ Meaningful in the presence of arbitrary side information
- Several current deployments


Apple


Google


US Census

- Burgeoning field of research


Algorithms


Statistics,
learning


Game theory, economics


Databases, programming languages


Law, policy

## Differential Privacy



- Data set $x=\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right) \in \mathcal{X}$
$>$ Domain $\mathcal{X}$ can be numbers, categories, tax forms
$>$ Think of x as fixed (not random)
- $A=$ probabilistic procedure
$>A(x)$ is a random variable
$>$ Randomness might come from adding noise, resampling, etc.


## Differential Privacy



- A thought experiment
$>$ Change one person's data (or add or remove them) $>$ Will the probabilities of outcomes change?


For any set of outcomes, (e.g. I get denied health insurance) about the same probability in both worlds

## A First Algorithm: Randomized Response

## Randomized Response (Warner 1965)



- Say we want to release the proportion of diabetics in a data set
$>$ Each person's data is I bit: $x_{i}=0$ or $x_{i}=1$
- Randomized response: each individual rolls a die
$>$ I, 2, 3 or 4: Report true value $x_{i}$
$>5$ or 6: Report opposite value $1-x_{i}$

- Output is list of reported values $Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{n}$
$>$ It turns out that we can estimate fraction of $x_{i}$ 's that are 1 when $n$ is large


## Randomized Response

| $i$ | $x_{i}$ | Die roll | $Y_{i}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 0 | 5 | yes |
| 2 | 1 | 1 | yes |
| 3 | 1 | 3 | yes |
| 4 | 1 | 2 | yes |
| 5 | 0 | 6 | yes |
| 6 | 0 | 4 | no |
| 7 | 1 | 2 | yes |
| 8 | 0 | 3 | no |
| 9 | 1 | 2 | yes |
| 10 | 1 | 5 | no |

What sort of privacy does this provide?

- Many possible answers

One approach: Plausible deniability
$>x_{10}$ could have been 0
$>x_{8}$ could have been 1

- Suppose we fix everyone else's data $x_{1}, \ldots, x_{9} \ldots$
- What is

$$
\frac{\operatorname{Pr}\left(Y_{10}=n o \mid x_{10}=1\right)}{\operatorname{Pr}\left(Y_{10}=n o \mid x_{10}=0\right)} ?
$$

## Differential Privacy



- A thought experiment
$>$ Change one person's data (or add or remove them) $>$ Will the probabilities of outcomes change?


For any set of outcomes, (e.g. I get denied health insurance) about the same probability in both worlds

## Plausible deniability and RR

A bit more generally...

- Fix any data set $\vec{x} \in\{0,1\}^{n}$, and any neighboring data set $\vec{x}^{\prime}$
$>$ Let $i$ be the position where $x_{i} \neq x_{i}^{\prime}$
$>\left(\right.$ Recall $x_{j}=x_{j}^{\prime}$ for all $\left.j \neq i\right)$
- Fix an output $\vec{a} \in\{0,1\}^{n}$

$$
\operatorname{Pr}(A(\vec{x})=\vec{a})=\left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{\#\left\{j: x_{j}=a_{j}\right\}}\left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{\#\left\{j: x_{j} \neq a_{j}\right\}}
$$

(because decisions made independently)

- When we change one output, one term in the product changes (from $\frac{2}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{3}$ or vice versa)
- So $\frac{\operatorname{Pr}(A(\vec{x})=\vec{a})}{\operatorname{Pr}(A(\vec{x})=\vec{a})} \in\left\{\frac{1}{2}, 2\right\}$.


## Recall basic probability facts

- Random variables have expectations and variances

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}(X)=\sum_{x} x \cdot \operatorname{Pr}(X=x) \\
& \operatorname{Var}(X)=\mathbb{E}\left((X-\mathbb{E}(X))^{2}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

- Expectations are linear: For any rv's $X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}$ and constants $a_{1}, \ldots, a_{n}$ :

$$
\mathbb{E}\left(\sum_{i}^{\mu_{n}} a_{i} X_{i}\right)=\sum_{i} a_{i} \mathbb{E}\left(X_{i}\right)
$$

- Variances add over independent random variables. If $X_{1}, \ldots, X_{n}$ are independent, then

$$
\operatorname{Var}\left(\sum_{i} a_{i} X_{i}\right)=\sum_{i} a_{i}^{2} \operatorname{Var}\left(X_{i}\right)
$$

- The standard deviation is $\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}\left(X_{i}\right)}$


## Exercise 1: sums of random variables

- Say $X_{1}, X_{2}, \ldots, X_{n}$ are independent with, for all $i$,

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}\left(X_{i}\right)=\mu \\
& \sqrt{\operatorname{Var}\left(X_{i}\right)}=\sigma
\end{aligned}
$$

- Then what are the expectation and variance of the average $\bar{X}=\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_{i}$ ?
a) $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X})=\mu n$ and $\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(\bar{X})}=n \sigma$
b) $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X})=\mu$ and $\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(\bar{X})}=\sigma$
c) $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X})=\mu$ and $\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(\bar{X})}=\sigma / \sqrt{n}$
d) $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X})=\mu$ and $\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(\bar{X})}=\frac{\sigma}{n}$
e) $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X})=\mu / n$ and $\sqrt{\operatorname{Var}(\bar{X})}=\frac{\sigma}{n}$


## Exercise 2: Estimating $\sum_{i} x_{i}$ from $R R$

- Show there is a procedure which, given $Y_{1}, \ldots, Y_{n}$, produces an estimate $A$ such that

Standard deviation of estimate

Equivalently, $\sqrt{\mathbb{E}\left(\frac{A}{n}-\bar{X}\right)^{2}}=O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right)$
$>$ Hint: What are the mean and variance of $3 Y_{i}-1$ ?

## Randomized response for other ratios

- Each person has data $x_{i} \in \mathcal{X}$
$>$ Normally data is more complicated than bits
- Tax records, medical records, Instagram profiles, etc
$>$ Use $\mathcal{X}$ to denote the set of possible records
- Analyst wants to know sum of $\varphi: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow\{0,1\}$ over $\boldsymbol{X}$
$>$ Here $\varphi$ captures the property we want to sum
$>$ E.g. "what is the number of diabetics?"
- $\varphi(($ Adam, 168 lbs., 17, not diabetic $))=0$
- $\varphi(($ Ada, 142 lbs., 47, diabetic $))=1$
- We want to learn $\sum_{i=1}^{n} \varphi\left(x_{i}\right)$

For each person $i$,

$$
\left.\left.\begin{array}{l}
\text { - Randomization operator takes } z \in\{0,1\}: \quad Y_{i}=R\left(\varphi\left(x_{i}\right)\right) \\
Z \\
\text { w.p. } \frac{e^{\epsilon}}{e^{\epsilon}+1} \\
1-z \\
\text { w.p. } \frac{1}{e^{\epsilon}+1}
\end{array}\right\} \text { Ratio is } e^{\epsilon} \text { (think } 1+\epsilon \text { for small } \epsilon\right)
$$

## Randomized response for other ratios

- Each person has data $x_{i} \in \mathcal{X}$
$>$ Analyst wants to know sum of $\varphi: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow\{0,1\}$ over $\boldsymbol{x}$
- Randomization operator takes $z \in\{0,1\}$ :

$$
R(z)= \begin{cases}z & \text { w.p. } \frac{e^{\epsilon}}{e^{\epsilon}+1} \\ 1-z & w \cdot p \cdot \frac{1}{e^{\epsilon}+1}\end{cases}
$$

- How can we estimate a proportion?
$>A\left(x_{1}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ :
- For each $i$, let $Y_{i}=R\left(\varphi\left(x_{i}\right)\right)$
- Return $A=\sum_{i}\left(a Y_{i}-b\right)$
$\Rightarrow$ What values for $a, b$ make $\mathbb{E}(A)=\sum_{i} \varphi\left(x_{i}\right)$ ? Coming up ...
- Proposition: $\sqrt{\mathbb{E}\left(A-\sum_{i} \varphi\left(x_{i}\right)\right)^{2}}=\frac{e^{\epsilon / 2}}{e^{\epsilon}-1} \sqrt{n} . \approx \frac{2 \sqrt{n}}{\epsilon}$ when $\epsilon$ small

